Ledger hardware wallet

“People bought compromised devices from reputable sources and still lost all their buttcoins.”

“they've previously stockpiled customer data which leaked and lead sustained targeted attacks on their customers”

“How would this have helped here? The attackers included the radio.”

“Potting the entire device for starters would have been the standard.”

“Ledger appears to have taken almost zero precautions against hardware attacks”

“Unfortunately it's just an option; would be nice to have that be the default.”

“older iphone with lockdown mode enabled has better security than any of these ledger wallets”

“I actually consider Ledger one of the more competent vendors in this space”

“They actually have a quite thorough hardware security model, outlining which components are and aren't considered critical”

“Ledger has a whole list of issues, they became the most popular brand not because they're the most trustworthy”

“If you ever go through TSA with this type of wallet they can read your key off the scanner.”

“I consider Ledger to be relatively sophisticated”

“I have no particular expertise in hardware security and even I would have made put more effort in.”

“there have been several crypto wallets that use much better hardware security”

“it highlights the abject failure of the company to even make an attempt at security”

“Tamper proofing hardware is among the hardest things there are, especially if you are up against nation-state actors”

“Didn't even consider being potentially able to replace the battery, but it would have been nice.”

“an untampered Ledger is still OK as long as you don't pair it with a compromised machine”

“putting everything on a single key HW device like this is the poster child”

“The entire board is covered in test pads which make it super easy to solder dodgy stuff onto.”

“Ledger devices generate a private key internally, and it never leaves the device's secure element chip.”

“It's stupidly easy to open the device. I opened mine last night with a knife and a hairdryer.”

“If Ledger designed their hardware the same, this attack would not be possible.”

“Well add "Ledger" to the pile of crypto companies that are finished.”

“Ledger devices are exactly what you’re describing: the key stays on the device, you don’t enter it anywhere.”

“Ledger is an obviously low-quality product on even a cursory inspection”

“You'd probably want to use diversity for this”

“Why would they put all this effort in protecting the key within the chip and then go ahead and leak it via the screen?”

“it explicitly warns that it cannot detect added implants when the device's original Secure Element remains intact.”

“This was stealing the seed phrases as they were being displayed so the user could make the paper backup”

“The fact that there is not even the slightest attempt at securing the device against this kind of attacks is entirely on the manufacturer.”

“was selling these compromised devices on store shelves in every city in Germany”

“people have been sold the lie that a hardware wallet was secure: it's not”

“the first three incidents make up a pretty bad security track record”

“have you thought about using something like ledger/beancount for the storage?”

“a local cost observability tool that scans local session files to track per-PR, runaway (p99) sessions, and per-session cost”

“the "approved" entries seem much lower signal”

“It stores absolutely nothing.”

“They've exposed their customers contacts in 2020, getting targeted phishing since then.”

“Ledger firmware updates are closed‑source binaries delivered from Ledger's servers.”