gVisor

“gvisor isn't quite the same security level though”

“As far as I know, Firecracker, gVisor, and Kata Containers are the solution here.”

“gVisor is still pretty useful for untrusted workloads when you don't have KVM”

“it has a pretty long list of limitations that make it difficult to deploy transparently”

“The networking stack is actually used by many open source project such as tailscale”

“Per syscall performance overhead has surprisingly low impact on overall performance of programs.”

“gVisor does have some compatibility issue, as it is re-implementation of the kernel in Go.”

“I did like gVisor from Google. It wasn't easy to figure out how to get it working tho.”

“gvisor in particular helps you further reduce attack surface for root”

“the conclusion to use firecracker or gvisor is obvious, that's what they were made for”

“exposes a slightly broader attack surface due to the tighter integration model”

“It drives the cost up by like 3 orders of magnitude and it pairs well with other mitigations.”

“we didn't want to require KVM/ hardware support so we went with gVisor and have been very happy with it”

“Recently gVisor added cuda checkpoint automation support, please consider using that”

“Standalone gvisor (not the 'do' subcommand) used to be a mess with the OCI json requirement”

“If isolation is important then you probably need to switch to at least gVisor”

“DNS resolution is completely different with runsc vs runc and had to switch back.”

“the performance overhead of gvisor is substantial”

“really strong sandboxing solutions, such as gvisor or firecracker, do a really good job of having very little attack surface”

“theoretically you can get to fairly complete security via containers + a gVisor setup but at the expense of a ton of syscall performance”

“And it also happens to be among the most secure methods you are going to find.”

“Memory overhead is real—about 120MB per sandbox vs 15MB for raw containers.”

“every AI agent now runs inside gVisor — Google's user-space kernel that intercepts every syscall before it touches your host.”

“they felt way too heavy for a daily dev workflow.”

“where it would sometimes null-truncate large network packets”

“One of the big benefits that gVisor offers is that it doesn't require nested virtualization”

“The performance of gVisor is often a big limiting factor in deployment.”

“The huge gVisor drawback is that it drastically slows down applications”

“memory is already the main bottleneck with runsc overhead”

“we use gVisor to intercept syscalls so the workload is fully isolated from the host”

“runsc memory overhead became the main bottleneck at scale”

“even with the exploit you're trapped in a sandbox with no access to the host node”

“gvisor intercepts those syscalls so they never actually reach the host kernel.”

“If I want to use gVisor instead of Docker, that should be a very small adaptation.”

“Actual Linux with the full ecosystem, solid isolation, no emulation overhead.”

“consider alternative runtimes such as runsc (also known as gVisor)”

“You can also try changing the underlying container runtime to something like gVisor if you want more security”

“It doesn't help that gvisor refuses to acknowledge the modern world.”

“you can use the runsc (gvisor) runtime for docker, if you are careful not to expose vulnerable protocols to the container there will be nothing escaping it with that runtime”

“something like gVisor to limit the attack surface of a containerized process”